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DISTRIBUTIONS ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT
TO A DIVIDEND-UNDERSTANDING THE
EQUATION
PAUL F. MICKEY AND JAMES P. HOLDEN*
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Although appreciation in value of corporate stock is generally
taxed as capital gain when the stock is sold, a different result may
obtain where the stock is sold to the issuing corporation. If stock
is -transferred, to the issuing corporation as a step in complete liqui-'
dation, the transfer is properly regarded as a sale.' Similarly, when
a shareholder sells -al of his stock to the issuing corporation, sale
treatment is appropriate even though the corporation is not liqui-
dated.2 In either, case, the corporate-shareholder relationship has
been terminated arid a final calculation of profit on the surrendered
shares is proper.
But when a sole shareholder "sells" a single share of stock to
his .wholly-owned corporation,, has anything o'ccurred which justifies
a final calculation of profit on the surrendered share? It seems not,
for the shareholder remains the sole owner of the corporation, and
there has been no meaningful change in his position, except to the
extent that he has more cash and the corporation has less. 'Nor .is
the effect different if there are two shareholders, each owning fifty
per cent and each receiving an equal amount of cash in exchange
for a few shares. Nor is it .different if there are a thousand share-
holders, each receiving his pro rata share of the distribution and
surrendering a pro rata portion of his stock. In these instances, the
distribution is more akin to a withdrawal of profits by a dividend
than to a realization of profit through a sale: of stock.
Congress has'provided A rather brief set of statutory rules to
distinguish those distributions which are entitled to be treated as
sales from those which must b'e regarded as dividends. These 'rules
apply t6 "fhe fields of stock .tedemp'tiohi partial liquidation,4 and
* Members of the District of Columbia Bar.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 331.
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (3).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 331(a) (2), 346.
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reorganization. .-The problem of distinguishing dividends fr"ifi"
sales or exchanges in the field of reorganizations is peculiar to that-
field, being governed largely by the Supreme Court's decision in-
Estate of Bedford.' But in the areas of stock redemption and partial'
liquidation, theproblem is very .much alive and very much in need
of clarification. It is with the stock redemption and partial liquida-
tion rules that this article is concerned.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE TEST
After the Supreme Court'in 1920 established :the principle that
stock dividends are not income,7 Congress found it necessary to
deal with the tax aloidance device whereby stock distributed as a'
nontaxable dividend was promptly redeemed with-the benefit of capi-
tal gain treatment.8 It did so by providing iri 'he Revenue Act of'
1921 that the payment in redemptiofi iight be taxed as a dividend
rather than as a payment in exchange for the stock if' - it was
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" :
A stock dividend shall not be subject io tax but if after the
distribution of any such dividend the corporation proceeds -to,
cancel or redeem its stock at such time and in such manner as
to 'make the distribution and cancellation or redemption essential-
ly equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount
received in redemption or cancellation of the stock shall be treated
as a taxable dividend .... 9
*INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 356(a) (2).
'Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283" (1945).
' Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
-' Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §. 201(d), 42 Stat. 228. During debate in-
the Senate on this provision, the following, remarks were made by Senator
McCumber:
Mr. President, nothing has developed at the present, time to neces-,
sitate this proposed amendment, but conditions are ripening, I think,
amqng a number of corporations for them to .declare stock dividends
which, under the late decision of the Supreme Court, would not be
taxablq, and then, we will say in a month or a short, time there-
after, to redeem the stock, in other, words, 'cancel the stock. In
that way, under the.law as it now stands, and under' fihe Supreme
Court decision, a stockholder would. not be compelled to pay a tax
upon the income so derived. The amendment is for the purpose 6f .
preventing the provision relating to the exemption of stock divi-",
dends from being used for a fraudulent purpose where the divi-'
dend is simply declared and then the stock taken up or traded
back again in some way so that the stockholder will be free from. the
tax.
61 CONG. REc. 7507 (1921) (remarks of Senator McCumber).Revenue Act of 1921, -ch. 136,-§ 201(d), -42 Stat 228. ...
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This statute was amended in 1924 to operate whether the redemp-
tion preceded or followed the stock dividend.1" The Revenue Act
of 1926 eliminated altogether the necessity for a stock dividend,
extending the rule to all stock redemptions:
If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not
such stock was issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in
such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or
redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the dis-
tribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in re-
demption or cancellation of the stock . . . shall be treated as a
taxable dividend."
This dividend equivalence test was later embodied in section 115 (g),
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,12 and it survives today in
the forms discussed below.
I Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, distributions in re-
demption of stock (other than those occurring during the course
of complete liquidation) are governed either by section 302 or by
section 346.1" The tax status of distributions governed by section
302 is determined by their effect at the shareholder level, and the
tax status of those governed by section 346 is determined by their
effect at the corporate level. Although both technically involve dis-
tributions in redemption of stock, those in the former category
are here referred to as "stock redemptions" while those in the second
category are referred to as "partial liquidations."
A stock redemption under section 302 may escape dividend
classification by satisfying any one of three tests. TwO14 of these
tests employ precise mathematical computations, having made their
appearance in the 1954 Code as a product of the widespread de-
1" Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(f), 43 Stat. 255.11Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 201 (g), 44 Stat. 11. Both of the com-
mittee reports make it clear that the concern of Congress was with tax
avoidance through the redemption of a pro rata portion of the stock of
each shareholder, resulting in a distribution of cash but no alteration in
corporate ownership. H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1926); S.
REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1926). The history of the redemp-
tion provisions of the Internal Revenue Code is reviewed in Darrell, Cor-
porate Liquidations and the Federal Income Tax, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 907
(1941).1
"Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 289, § 115(g), 52 Stat. 497 (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 302(b) (1), 346(a) (2)).
1 See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 303, which relates to distributions
in redemption of stock to pay death taxes.
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 302(b) (2) (substantially disproportion-
ate), 302(b) (3) (complete termination of shareholder's interest).
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sire for certainty. The third test' simply requires that the distri-
bution not be "essentially equivalent" to a dividend and is the legatee
of the dividend equivalence test of earlier statutes.
A partial liquidation under section 346 finds its escape from
dividend classification by satisfying either of two tests. One is
mechanical,"6 having its genesis also in the 1954 search for certain-
ty. The otherir is the general dividend equivalence standard which
requires that the distribution not be "essentially equivalent" to a
dividend.
III. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE
In the economic sense, a dividend is a distribution of cash or
property which does not alter the respective interests of sharehold-
ers in the corporation." Logically then, a distribution of cash or
property to shareholders is essentially equivalent to a dividend if
it results in essentially no alteration in their respective interests.
But the courts generally have not approached the problem with
strict logic.
Instead they have applied criteria which are largely irrelevant,
studiously avoiding a definitive conclusion that one need look mere'-
ly to the pro rata character of the distribution. The result is con-
fusion and uncertainty, leading even the courts to refer to the
decisions as a "morass ' ' 19 and to the inquiry as a "most exasperat-
ing task,"2 0 "a nightmarish problem,"'" and a "vexing question."'
The statutory standard has been termed "a Delphic proscription"'
and a "vague negative test."2 The Sixth Circuit states character-
istically: "The . . . language of §115(g) has been in the revenue
15 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (1).
16INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 346(b) (termination of business).
17 INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 346(a) (2).
"8 Pullman, Inc., 8 T.C. 292 (1947). See Bittker & Redlich, Corporate
Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. lEv. 437, 476 (1950). Al-
though the distribution must be out of current or accumulated earnings in
order to constitute a "dividend" within the meaning of section 316 of the
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, the matter is of little moment in assessing the
economic effect (as opposed to the ultimate tax treatment) upon the share-
holder and the corporation.
' Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1962).
,o Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71, 76 (1960).
"
1 Wilson v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 341, 342 (N.D.N.Y. 1957).
"Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 1962).
" J. Milton Sorem, 40 T.C. 206, 218 (1963) (dissenting opinion), rev'd,
334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964).
"Ballenger v. United States, 301 F2d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 1962).
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statutes since 1926i and over the years the courts have searched for
some -sure touchstone .... :. The search has, been in vain. 25
A. The Judicial Criteria
The criteria employed by the courts in an attempt to identify
dividend distributions include such factors as whether the distri-
bution was motivated 'by a valid business purpose, whether the
transaction resulted in a shift in proportionate ownership, whether
the distribution was initiated by the corporation or by its share-
holders, whether the corporation has a history of paying dividends,
and whether the corporate business was contracted as a consequence
of the distribution. As the following discussion will indicate, only
the inquiry as to shift in proportional ownership is truly relevant
in distinguishing dividends from sales or exchanges.
The most frequently enunciated test applied by the courts is the
so-called "net effect" test,. which had its birth in the following
passage from Flanagan -v. Ielvering.2" After listing the above
criteria, the court concluded: "But the net effect of the distribution
rather than the motives and plans of the taxpayer or his corpora-
tion, is the fundamental question in administering § 115(g) [sec-
tion 302(b)(1) of the 1954 Code]. '2 7 The "net effect" test has
resulted in confusion because of the uncertain meaning of the term.
Some courts quote Flanagan for the proposition that "net effect"
rather than "motives and plans" governs, and then proceed imme-
diately into an examination of criteria involving motive and pur-
pose, such as the business purpose of the distribution and other
similar factors.28 Other courts believe that the "net effect" test
requires elimination from consideration of such factors as business
purpose.29 -Some, consciously or unconsciously hedging the issue,
state that business purpose is irrelevant, but add that they are un-
able to' find one anyway.30 Some courts rationalize the result by
stating that there are two versions of the net effect test, the strict
which admifs of no factors such as business purppse and the not-
so-strict which permits such inquiry."1
25 Woodworth v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 719, 723 (6th Cir. 1955).
28116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
Id. at 939-40.
E.g., Keefe V. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 .(1st Cir. 1954).
-E.g., Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1957):
" E.g., Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962)
81 Ibid.
[Vol, 43
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All of this is interesting, but unhelpful. The truth, of course.
is that "net effect" has no independent meaning. That it-is -a mere
paraphrase of the statutory term "essentially equivalent" has, been
stated well by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
"Net effect" is a paraphrase for "essentially equivalent." It is
just as if the statute read: "If a corporation redeems its stock
in whole or in part, so that the net effect of the transaction is
the same as the payment of a taxable dividend, the amount so
distributed shall be treated as a taxable dividend." The net effect
test is not a test but an attractive abbreviation of the statute, as
to which we shall be on safer ground' if we Stick to the words of
the statute: essentially equivalent s.3 2
The lengthy discussions of the various gradients and ingredients
of the net effect test come more clearly into focus when it is remem-
bered that these are but gradients and ingredients of the "essential-
ly equivalent" test. The cause of clarity would be served if the"
term "net effect" were dropped and the statutory phrase 'reinstated.
Although the standard criteria listed above are frequently ap-
plied by the courts, the relevance of most of. them is subject to
question. They serve no logical function in distinguishing distri-
butions which are essentially and realistically a division of profits
from those which are essentially and realistically in payment for
retired stock. They will not stand analysis.
At one time, it was felt that the existence of a legitimate busi-
ness purpose would absolve even a pro rata distribution from divi-
dend equivalence. 33 This reasoning leads to an absurd result-if
the existence of a business purpose.will rescue .a distribution from
being treated as a dividend, it must be true that dividend distribu-
tions are not motivated by legitimate business purposes. This' is
obviously incorrect. The existence of a legitimate business purpose
is as consistent wiih a dividend as witha sale.
Among the types of business purpose frequently advanced are
the elimination of.debt owing from shareholders to the corporation
and consequent improvement of the corporate balance sheet,3 4 the
Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607, 609-10 (5th Cir. 1954).
Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954). See Treusch, Corporate
Distributions and Adjustments: Recent Case Reminders of Some Old Frob-
lems Under the New Code, 32 TAXES 1023, 1036-40 (1954). A listing of
the types of business purpose advanced in the cases is found in 17-2d T.M,
CORPORATE STOcK REDEMPTION at A-23 -28 (1964).
."This argument has been advanced in many cases,. among them Brad-
bury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962); Estate of .Lukens v.
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reduction in value of stock to facilitate purchase by new investors,s5
and the desire to make stock available for purchase by employees. 6
Aside from the basic fact that the existence of a business purpose
simply does not serve to distinguish a dividend from a sale, these
arguments are seldom logically persuasive. Debts owing from share-
holders to the corporation may be discharged by a dividend distri-
bution equally as well as by, a redemption of stock. The value of
stock may be reduced as effectively by a dividend distribution as
by a redemption of stock. Though the desire to sell stock to em-
ployees may be laudatory, it would not appear to justify a redemp-
tion from existing shareholders, for there certainly are other equally
available sources of stock.37
Business purpose would be relevant if motive were at issue, but
dividend treatment does not flow from the existence of a tax avoid-
ance motive. 8 It flows instead from dividend equivalence, a
status rather than a state of mind. A transfer of stock to the
issuing corporation with the clear purpose of obtaining a favorable
tax result is nevertheless a sale, if the transaction is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend. Although the business purpose inquiry
does not preoccupy the courts to the extent that it formerly did,
the reluctance of the courts to discard the business purpose inquiry
sometimes leads to misconceptions concerning the relevance of in-
tent as an issue.3 9 However, a majority of appellate courts now
Commissioner, 246 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1957); Hirsch v. Commissioner, 124
F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1941). For discussion of this motivation and of the
desire to make stock available for sale to others, see Moore, Dividend
Equivalence-Taxation of Distributions in Redemption of Stock, 19 TAx
L. REv. 249 (1964).
3 5United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
" Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949).
"'In Commissioner v. Snite, supra note 36, the purpose of obtaining
stock for resale to employees was advanced to justify the redemption of
3,500 shares at a time when the corporation had available 15,000 authorized
but unissued shares.
" "Neither artifice, subterfuge, or bad faith need be present to bring
a transaction within the meaning of the statute here involved, for as we
read the law a taxpayer may well act with the utmost good purpose and
without evil intent and yet his transactions may in effect be the equivalent
of the distribution of a taxable dividend." McGuire v. Commissioner, 84
F.2d 431, 432 (7th Cir. 1936).
' See, e.g., Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 198 (4th Cir.
1962), where the court states that tax avoidance is always assumed to be
a purpose of a pro rata redemption under the approach of courts which
consider proof of business purpose irrelevant. This statement seems to as-
sume that tax avoidance is an essential ingredient for dividend equivalence
and that even those courts which will not accept proof on the issue of bona
[Vol. 43
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recognize that the existence of a single bona fide business purpose
will not preclude a finding of dividend equivalence.4"
The courts have applied various other criteria in their quest for
a dividend equivalence standard. The resulting absurdity is amply
illustrated by one court's assertion that "not only is the legitimacy
of the business objective to be achieved a factor to be considered"
but in addition other criteria must be applied to determine the "pur-
ity of the motive for the redemption."4
One of the criteria is "initiative"-if the distribution is initiated
by the shareholders rather than the corporation, it is thought to
resemble a dividend. This is, in reality, merely a redundant state-
ment of the business purpose factor, for its only object is to seek
the origin of the motivation. It is difficult to see why shareholder
initiation is indicative of a dividend as distinguished from a sale.
If a shareholder desires to sell his stock, is it not quite appropriate
for him to initiate negotiations? Even if the locus of initiative
were thought relevant, how could the initiative of shareholders be
distinguished realistically from that of management in the close
corporation ?42 This standard has served largely as a makeweight ;43
it is unhelpful and merely obscures the true issue.
The dividend history of the corporation and its accumulation
of earnings are frequently considered. It is said, though the prem-
ise is at best questionable, that a redemption by a company with
a poor dividend history or a large accumulation of earnings is more
suspect than is a redemption by a less affluent corporation. This
criterion also bears only on motive or purpose and does not assist
with the ultimate question of whether a particular distribution is
or is not essentially equivalent to a dividend. And there is little
reason to allow a company having a generous dividend record great-
er leeway in purchasing stock than a company with a niggardly
record." It has been recognized that the criterion of dividend his-
fides assume the existence of a tax avoidance motive where the distribu-
tion is pro rata. It is difficult to accept the validity of the court's position.
" Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 118 (1st Cir. 1962); Heman
v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 227, 231 (8th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Fewell,
255 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1958); Kessner v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d
943 (3d Cir. 1957); Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.
1957); Neff v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 322, 327, 305 F.2d 455, 457
(1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963).
"Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1962).
"Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651, 657 (1st Cir. 1954).
" Bittker & Redlich, supra note 18, at 469-70.
"Id. at 473.
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tory is of little htlp,4 5 ,and it should be eliminated from considera-
tion. The presence of accumulated earnings has been stated to be
irrelevant by the Senate Finance Committee,4 and the regulations
•now provide that the determination shall be made without regard to
'accumulated earnings. 47
Otaer criteria are the contraction of the corporate business and
-continued profitable operation of the business. There were some
logical difficulties with the contraction factor under the 1939 Code,48
and the 1954 revision appears to have limited its influence to the
area of partial liquidation. 9 Corporate contraction is discussed be-
low in relation to that particular subject."
B. The Pro Rata Standard
A- distribution is; by its nature, essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend if it is essentially pro rata. This criterion is unique in its
relevance. If courts adhered to it, the opinions in the area of divi-
dend equivalence w6uld be vastly more meaningful.
Recognitionof the pro rata criterion as the exclusive test would
alter the result in few cases, for the courts, with a surprising degree
of consistency, find dividend equivalence in the case of pro rata
distributions and fail to find it in the case of non-pro rata distri-
butions. The appellate decisions are nearly uniform in result, with
almost all pro rata (or essentially pro rata) distributions treated
United States v. Collins, 300 F.2d 821, 825 (1st Cir. 1962).
,S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1954).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(a) (.1955).
40 See Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954), where
a pro rata distribution of corporate assets to shareholders was held not
essentially equivalent to a dividend because it resulted in a contraction of
the corporate business. A similar result obtained in Joseph Imler, 11 T.C.
836 (1948), where the proceeds of fire insurance were distributed. A pro
rata distribution is not logically any less a dividend simply because it is
accompanied by a contraction of business. Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & War-
ren, A Technical Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corpo-
rate Distributions to Shareholders, 52 CoLum. L. Rav. 1 (1952). There the
authors state that "we should not be moved by, the emotional case in which
cash results from an 'involuntary conversion' of a part of the business .
Such proceeds are simply cash profits being distributed." Id. at 38.
"' Since the tax consequences of stock redemptions are, under the 1954
Code, to be determined by reference to events at the shareholder level, S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954), the contraction factor appears
clearly irrelevant to stock redemptions and the logical problem of its effect
on dividend equivalence is thus' eliminated,, The area of partial liquida-
tions, in which the contraction factor enjoys increased rather than dimin-
ished prominence, is discussed ,in S ection V, of the text.
"0 See Section V of the text.
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as dividends51 and non-pr6 rata distributions treate'd as sales. 5-
There are, however, five appellate opinions in which pro rata distri-
butions were accorded sale treatment.53
The first,5 4 decided by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, must
be considered an anomaly, as that court later retreated.55 In the
second, the court held that the distribution was not pro rata, which
seems erroneous. But since the court was proceeding on a finding
that it was not pro rata, the result springs from a questionable
finding of fact rather than a difference in approach. In the third,5 7
a pro rata distribution was treated as a sale because the corporate
business had been contracted. This case raises the special problem
which is now limited to partial liquidations.5" The fourth and fifth
cases59 offer no easy solution, and if the pro rata standard is ac-
"Pro rata (or nearly pro rata) distributions were held, despite a con-
siderable struggle in some cases, essentially equivalent to dividends in the
following representative appellate opinions: Ballenger v. United States, 301
F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Collins, 300 F.2d 821 (1st Cir.
1962); Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962); Heman
v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960); Pacific Vegetable Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1957); Bell v. Commissioner,
248 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1957); Kessner v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 943 (3d
Cir. 1957); Phelps v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1957); Ferro
v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957); Woodworth v. Commis-
sioner, 218 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1955); Commissioner v. Roberts, 203 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1954); Boyle v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1951);
Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 23 (2d.Cir. 1946); Hirsch v.
Commissioner, 124 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1941); Flanagan v. Helvering, '116
F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940); McGuire v.. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431 (7th
Cir. 1936).
" Estate of Lukens v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1957);
Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1957).
"United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961); Keefe v. Cote,
213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607 (5th
Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949); Bains
v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 599, 289 F.2d 644 (1961).
", Keefe v. Cote, supra note 53, where the court strained to uphold ajury verdict in favor of the taxpayer despite the pro rata character of the
distribution.
" Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962).
" Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1949), where stock
was redeemed for the purpose of resale to employees. All of the stock of the
corporation was owned by a husband and wife and trusts for their children.
" Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954),'.where the
corporation distributed operating assets pro rata to its shareholders.
, See Section V of the text.
"United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Bains v. United
States, 151 Ct. C1. 599, 289 F.2d 644 (1961). In both of these cases, a
pro rata distribution was followed by the elimination of a shareholder, and
the main question was the status of the continuing shareholder. In both
cases, the distribution actually received by the continuing shareholder was
held to be not equivalent to a dividend. This result seims clearly erroneous.
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cepted as the governing rule, they must be viewed as wrongly de-
cided.
Thus, among the numerous appellate court opinions, there appear
to be only two6" in which both result and reasoning are at odds
with the pro rata standard of dividend equivalence. Adherence to
the pro rata standard would not cause any revolution of result, but
it would substitute logic and clarity for irrelevance and confusion
in dealing with the problem at both administrative and judicial
levels.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE 1954 CODE ON THE PRO RATA STANDARD
OF DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCE
If the proper standard for measuring dividend equivalence is
the pro rata standard, have the mechanical tests of the 1954 Code
pre-empted the area, making the general test unnecessary? In effect,
the substantially disproportionate test6 ' and the complete termina-
tion of interest test 62 provide precise guides as to when an altera-
tion in the corporate-shareholder relation is significant enough to
justify treating the distribution as a sale. As a consequence, some
observers have predicted that little litigation will arise under the
general test of section 302(b) (1).3 But this prediction has not
proven accurate.6
Both cases are criticized in Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th
Cir. 1962).
" United States v. Carey, supra note 59; Bains v. United States, supra
note 59.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (2). See text accompanying notes
86 & 87 infra.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 302(b) (3), 346(b).
" Roeder, Distributions in Redemption of Stock, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON
FED. TAX 475, 484-85 (1957),; Wilson, Stock Redemptions as Dividends, 32
TAXES 718, 719 (1954).
" Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964); Kerr v.
Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963(1964) ; Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962) ; United
States v. Collins, 300 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1962); Bradbury v. Commissioner,
298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962); United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th
Cir. 1961); Hasbrook v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9715 (D. Vt.
1964); Friend v. United States, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9296 (D. Mass.
1964); Archbold v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 329 (D.N.J. 1962), aff'd
per curiam, 311 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1963); Sullivan v. Bookwalter, 63-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9151 (W.D. Mo. 1962); Cohron v. United States, 62-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9398 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Radnitz v. United States, 187 F.
Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 294 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1961);
Colvin v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 877 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Tate v. United
States, 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9464 (E.D. Ky. 1959); Neff v. United States
157 Ct. Cl. 322, 305 F.2d 455 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963);
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There are a number of areas in which the" general dividend
equivalence test continues to function. Since distributions which
are pro rata do not qualify as sales under the mechanical tests, the
general test continues to be the hoped-for haven in such cases. In
them, the courts continue to hear and write of business purpose,
initiative, dividend history, etc.65 These cases probably would not
come to litigation if the pro rata standard had been unequivocally
established in the past; they will continue until the courts so estab-
lish that standard.
Aside from the pro rata cases, the general dividend equivalence
test of section 302(b) (1) will operate where (1) the distribution
would be non-pro rata and thus qualify under the mechanical tests
but for the constructive ownership rules, (2) where the distribu-.
tion, though not pro rata, falls short of satisfying the mechanical
tests, and (3) where the special problem of preferred stock is in-
volved.
A. Distributions Which Fail the Mechanical Tests
Because of Constructive Ownership
Section 302(c) provides that the constructive ownership rules
of section 31866 shall apply "in determining the ownership of'stock
for purposes of this section."67 Both of the mechanical tests em-
bodied in sections 302(b) (2) and 302(b) (3) refer to ownership
of stock, and the constructive ownership rules clearly operate in
the application of those tests. But section 302(b) (1) speaks mere-
ly in'terms of dividend equivalence and does not refer to stock
ownership. Accordingly, there has been much discussion as to
whether the constructive ownership rules must be applied in deter-
Presley W. Moore, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEm. DEc. (33 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem.) 64020 (Jan. 30, 1964) ; Robert H. Herzog, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1815 (1963); Isidore Himmel, 41 T.C. 62 (1963); Estate of Herman Silver-
man, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 787 (1963); J. Milton Sorem, 40 T.C. 206
(1963), rev'd, 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964); Ralph L. Humphrey, 39
T.C. 199 (1962); Estate of Arthur Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq., 1961-
2 Cum. BULL. 5; Herbert C. Parker, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 976 (1961,),;
Charles J. Simon, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 119 (1961); Thomas G. Lewis,
35 T.C. 71 (1960).
" See, e.g., Neff v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 322, 305, F.2d 455 (1962);
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963); Presley W. Moore, P-H TAX CT. REP.
& MEM. DEc. (33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 64020 (Jan. 30, 1964)..
"' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 318(a), added by ch. 736, 68A Stat. 99
(1954), as amended,' Pub. L. No. 554, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a) (Aug,
31, 1964).
"'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 30 2 (c) (1).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
mining dividend equivalence under section 302(b) (1)," i.e., must
a distribution which is non-pro rata on the basis of legal owner-
ship be considered pro rata because of attributed ownership?
In the first case to present this issue, the Tax Court concluded
that it was required to attribute to an estate stock held by its bene-
ficiaries, thus making the estate the sole shareholder and the con-
clusion of dividend equivalence unavoidable with respect to a
redemption from the estate.69 But the Tax Court appeared to re-
treat from this position shortly thereafter,70 and subsequently to
reject it altogether.71 This result is altogether desirable. The func-
tion of the constructive ownership rules is to aggregate the holdings
of persons within a presumed community of interest in order to
6 Some commentators appear to conclude that the constructive owner-
ship rules have automatic application in dividend equivalence cases. See,
e.g., Winton & Hoffman, A Case Study of Stock Redemptions Under Sec-
tions 302 and 318 of the New Code, 10 TAx L. REv. 363, 366 n.13 (1955).
More generally they favor a flexible approach, giving weight, though not con-
trolling weight, to relationships among shareholders. See Gratch, How to
Redeem a Shareholder's Stock, 39 TAxEs 169, 176 (1961); Laikin, Stock
Redemptions: Sections 302 and 318, N.Y.U. 14Tn INST. ON FED. TAX 671,
686-87 (1956); Ringle, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership
in the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HAv. L. REv. 209, 224 (1958); Sutter,
Corporate Distributions of Property, Stock and Stock Rights-Dividend
or Redemption? 39 TAXES 982, 983-85 (1961). The reluctance to import
constructive ownership rules into dividend equivalence cases stems from
strong feeling respecting the operation of these rules:
Here, again, the mind is staggered by that Pandora's box of a
section, 318. Back and forth one goes, 'round and 'round one goes,
like the mating dance of the scorpions photographed in "The Living
Desert." It would be entirely ludicrous if it were not so important.
Owen, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under the 1954 Code,
32 TAxEs 979, 988 (1954).
It will be observed that the Treasury Department regulations take the
position that section 318(a) applies to all redemptions under section 302.
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-1(a) (1955). The regulations further provide that
constructive ownership under section 318 is one of the facts to be con-
sidered when making dividend equivalence determinations under section
302(b) (1). Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
"Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71 (1960).
"O See Estate of Arthur Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq., 1961-2 CuM.
BULL. 5.
"' See Herbert C. Parker, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mein. 976 (1961). But see
Samuel M. Levy, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.)
164131 (May 11, 1964), where the Tax Court unquestioningly attributed
a husband's stock to his wife. Although the result might not differ with
selective application, the approach certainly would. See also Bradbury v.
Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 116-17 n.7 (1st Cir. 1962), where the court,
although accepting the applicability of section 318, states that the imposition
of the attribution rules is "not inflexible" and that a showing of discord
may overcome their application.
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achieve a more realistic measure of ownership. But those rules are
only approximations of probabilities and may well be at variance
with actual facts. 2 If the presumed community of interest does
not in fact exist,73 there is little reason to deny capital gain treat-
ment merely on the basis of arbitrary rules. It is the function of
section 302(b) (1) to provide a vehicle for factual inquiry,74 and
conclusive presumptions of ownership are inconsistent with such an
inquiry.
The Subchapter C Advisory Group recommended that section
302 be amended to provide that the constructive ownership rules
do not apply under section 302(b) (1) but that the relationships
described in section 318 may be considered along with all the other
facts and circumstances.7" The Group understands this to be the
intent of the existing statute.78 The same amendment has been
recommended by the American Bar Association Section of Tax-
ation.77
The Senate Finance Committee report on the 1954 Code, in
discussing the mechanical tests, expressly states that the construc-
tive ownership rules apply to those tests." It does not make the
same statement with respect to the dividend equivalence test, and
the exclusion of section 302(b) (1) from the following discussion
seems intended:
Paragraph (1) [of 302(c)] provides that the rules for con-
structive ownership of stock of section 318(a) shall apply for
purposes of this section generally. For example, if an individual
owns half of the stock of a corporation, and a trust of which such
individual is the sole beneficiary, owns the other half of such stock,
a redemption of all of the stock of the corporation owned indi-
"For example, Pub. L. No. 554, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a) (Aug.
31, 1964), amended section 318 to eliminate so-called "sidewise attribution,"
effective with respect to redemptions occurring on or after the date of
enactment. The arbitrary action of the rules is thus obvious; one community
of interest might be presumed to exist on the day before enactment and an
altogether different one on the day after.
"The community of interest would not in fact exist under circumstances
such as estrangement of husband and wife, bad feelings between executor
and beneficiary, and geographical separation of children from father's busi-
ness.
'S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1954).
SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY GRoup, REVISED REPORT ON CoRPoRATE Dis-
TRIBUTIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS 5-6 (1958).
'a Ibid.
, ABA TAXATION SECTION, ANNUAL REPORT 35-37 (1961).S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 234-35 (1954).
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vidually would not qualify, under paragraph (2) or (3) of sub-
section (b). 79
This language seems to indicate that the Committee had no thought
that the constructive ownership rules would apply under the general
test.
Although it is sometimes said that attribution was not con-
sidered under the dividend equivalence test of earlier revenue acts,"0
the better view seems to be that relationship was a factor to be con-
sidered."' Most of the cases cited to sustain the proposition that
attribution was not a factor do not actually discuss the issue."2
Even though there is no sound basis for a conclusion that attri-
bution is mandatory in section 302(b) (1) cases, it is highly desir-
able that the section be amended in accordance with the Advisory
Group's proposal.8 3 The inquiry in dividend equivalence cases
should be whether or not the distribution is in fact pro rata, and
in this inquiry the court should not be constrained by hard and fast
constructive ownership rules, although it should take into consider-
ation the effect of relationships which are involved. 4 Indeed, if
factually justified, the court -might properly take into account rela-
tionships beyond those expressed in section 318,s1 for in the court's
Id. at 235. (Emphisis added.)
"See Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71, 77 (1960), where attribution in
dividend equivalence cases is described as "a new dimension."
"IEstate of Ray Blauner, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1400, 1406 (1961).
See Dean, The New Section 115(g) Regulations, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON
FED. TAX 587 (1953). In discussing a proposed amendment to Treas. Reg.
111, § 29.115-9 (1943), which would have established relationships as a
factor to be considered in dividend equivalence cases, the author states that
the "amendment would add nothing to the substantive law underlying that
redemption provision." Dean, supra at 609. The proposed amendment, 16
Fed. Reg. 10312 (1951), was never adopted.
" See, e.g., Summerfield v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Mich.
1956), aff'd per curiam, 249 F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1957); Jackson Howell,
26 T.C. 846 (1956), aff'd sub nora. Phelps v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 156
(9th Cir. 1957); Giles E. Bullock, 26 T.C. 276 (1956), aff'd per curiam,
253 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1958); Ada Murphy McFarlane, 23 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 468 (1954); Trust for Rosemary C. Weir, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
571 (1952); Estate of Henry V. Foster, 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 290 (1944).
But cf. Estate of Lukens v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1957);
Estate of Ira F. Searle, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 874 (1950). In Searle the
court expressly refused to attribute ownership of stock.
"SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY GRoup, op. cit. supra note 75, at 5-6.
"In Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964), the court,
in a dividend equivalence inquiry, ignored sidewise attribution through a
partnership but applied the family attribution rule.
" As, for example, where mother, daughter, and son-in-law own stock,
the son-in-law's ownership might well be attributed to the mother if peace
[Vol. 43
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factual evaluation of dividend equivalence, section 318 should in-
hibit neither the Government nor the taxpayer.
B. Distributions Which Fail to Meet the Mathematical
Limitations of the Mechanical Tests
A distribution is substantially disproportionate within the mean-
ing of section 302(b) (2) only if two conditions are met. The
first is that "immediately after the redemption the shareholder owns
less than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote."8 The second is that
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation
owned by the share holder immediately after the redemption
bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of-
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder immediately before the redemption
bears to all of the voting stock of the corp6ration at such
time.87
While this rule provides a reasonable guideline for determining
when a distribution is not pro rata, it certainly is not an exclusive
standard, and a distribution which misses qualification may still be
tested for dividend equivalence under the general standard.
The mechanical test is dearly arbitrary. In fact, there exists
some sympathy for the elimination of the fifty per cent require-
ment.8 8 Although the requirement that a shareholder own less than
fifty per cent of the stock after redemption insures either that he
will lose control or that he did not have it at the outset, there is
no particular magic in this. The substantial reduction, even of a
controlling shareholder's interest, which is required by the eighty
per cent calculation, would appear to make the distribution sufficient-
ly non-pro rata to eliminate dividend equivalence. Thus, it may
be that a distribution which would fail to qualify as substantially
disproportionate under section 302(b) (2) because of failure to
satisfy the fifty per cent test may yet qualify under section
302(b) (1) as not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
and tranquility reign within the family group. Cf. Bradbury v. Commis-
sioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962), where the court stopped short of
this mark.
' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (2) (B).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(b) (2) (C).
"8 Surrey, Income Tax Problemns of. Corporations and Shareholders, 14
TAx L. REv. 1, 4 (1958).
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Also, there is the question of determining at what precise point
a distribution ceases to be essentially non-pro rata and becomes pro
rata. Since section 302(b) (2) provides that the post-redemption
percentage may not be more than eighty per cent of the pre-re-
demption percentage, we may assume that a twenty per cent reduc-
tion of interest will generally qualify also as non-pro rata under
the general test of section 302(b) (1). If, on the other hand, there
is no reducti6of of the shareholder's interest, the distribution is
obviously pro rata. Somewhere between these figures of zero reduc-
tion and twenty per cent reduction lies the penumbra of dividend
equivalence."9 Although we may speculate that the point of dividend
equivalence lies closer to twenty per cent than to zero, thus per-
mitting only narrow misses of the mechanical test, this will remain
a problem for judicial inquiry and analysis.
C. The Special Problem of Preferred Stock
In explaining why it continued the flexible dividend equivalence
test of prior law, the Senate Finance Committee said this was true
particularly "in the case of redemptions of preferred stock which
might be called' by -the corporation without the shareholder having
any control over when the redemption may take place." 0 The re-
demption of preferred stock does present special problems, but it
is doubtful whether the emotional appeal of a shareholder's having
little control over the redemption is a proper consideration. Just
as in the case of common stock, initiative has little to do with the
problem. Instead," it is necessary to focus on the nature of the
distribution rather than the motives or purposes.of the parties.
•Stock which is-nonvoting and limited and preferred as to divi-
dends and in liquidation is closely akin to a debt security. Debt
capital, assuming no problem of thin capitalization,92 may generally
"See Sorem v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964), where
one shareholder's 50% interest -dropped to 43.77%, slightly more than the
40% which would be permitted under the substantially disproportionate test
of seetion 302(b) (2). The percentage reduction in this case was 12.46%.
Nevertheless, the distribution was held not essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend under section 302(b) (1).
" S. RP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1954).
" "Obviously, the line drawn between preferred stock and bonds may
in some instances come very close to one of form if the participation of
the preferred stock in earnings and assets is a limited one and the stock is
non-voting." SunmRY & WAmmN, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION 1551 (1960).
" See BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 114-17 (1959). In Isidore Himmel, 41 T.C. 62 (1963), it
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be repaid free of tax regardless of the pro rata character of the
payment.
1. A new policy.-The basic policy question is whether the re-
tirement of preferred stock should not be governed by the same
principles as the repayment of debt, i.e., should the tax-free recovery
of invested principal be permitted? Present law is inadequate be-
cause the dividend equivalence test really does not operate with
efficiency in the case of preferred stock and neither of the mechani-
cal tests is applicable.
Whether a distribution in redemption of preferred stock is pro
rata with respect to the preferred stock alone has generally been
thought irrelevant. Instead, attention has been focused on whether
common and preferred are held in substantially the same ,percent-
ages." If so, a distribution in redemption of preferredis thought
to be a dividend;94 if not, a sale is generally held to have occurred. 5
But there is no reason to assume that preferred stock is per-
manent capital-indeed, it generally is not. It may originate because
the incorporators find the credit position of the company will be
enhanced if their temporary capital investment takes the form of
preferred stock rather than debt. 6 Or preferred stock may be issued
in discharge of a debt owing to a shareholder in order to improve
the corporate credit position. 97 In either case, the preferred may
well be temporary capital, and if the proper safeguards are em-
ployed, the redemption of such preferred stock should have the same
consequences as the repayment of temporary -capital in the form
of debt."
was found that alleged debt for which preferred stock was issued was in
fact equity capital. Thus, the return of capital argument by the taxpayer
was rejected.
'
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(a) (1955).
""E.g., Robert H. Herzog, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Men. 1815 (1963).
E.g., Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1957).
"Samuel M. Levy, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEmi. DEc. (33 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem.) 64131 (May'll, 1964).
"E.g., Robert H. Herzog, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mein. 1815 (1963); Henry
A. Golwynne, 26 T.C. 1209 (1956).
"8 See Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, A Technical Revision of the
Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders,
52 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 26-27 (1952), where the authors reject the proposi-
tion that capital invested in preferred stock should be recoverable in the
same manner as debt. This position -is based on the assumed facts that
the same rule would have to -be extended to common -stock and that it
could not be restricted to new enterprises. These assumed facts appear
erroneous. Capital -invested in common stock is not recoverable as debt
because it is in all respects equity money. The proposed treatment of pre-
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Safeguards are obviously necessary to control the possibility of
tax avoidance, but these are not difficult to formulate. H.R. 3394,99
introduced by Representative Curtis, seeks to amend section 302
by adding a new subsection (b) (5). This subsection would, in
general, provide that a distribution in redemption of preferred stock
(i.e., nonvoting stock limited and preferred as to dividends and in
liquidation) qualifies as a sale to the extent of paid-in consideration
if when such preferred was issued the total paid in for preferred
stock and for debt owed to shareholders did not exceed the value
of the common stock.
This amendment incorporates some basic safeguards. First, pre-
ferred stock qualifying for its benefits must be nonvoting and limited
and preferred as to dividends and in liquidation. Thus, hybrid forms
of stock falling between common and such preferred would remain
subject to the existing rules. Second, the preferred must be issued
for a consideration and not as a dividend; sale treatment is extended
only to the recovery of the paid-in investment. This is appropriate
by analogy to debt, for only the recovery of the sum lent is there
permitted free of tax. Third, by limiting the ratio of preferred
stock and debt to common stock, excessive investment in temporary
capital is prevented. The one-to-one ratio seems appropriate, but
it would seem more realistic if the common stock measure were
the amount actually paid in rather than the fair market value of
the common at the time of measurement. Fair market value of
unlisted stock is always troublesome. Moreover, if the paid-in per-
manent capital is so low that it is exceeded by paid-in temporary
capital, the capital structure is sufficiently "thin" to raise questions.
Furthermore, the measurement should be made both upon issuance
of the preferred stock and at the time of redemption to prevent
avoidance of the limitation by timing the creation of shareholder
debt to follow rather than precede issuance of the preferred stock.
An amendment in the nature of that embodied in H.R. 3394
would permit shareholders to utilize either preferred stock or debt
for temporary capital so long as they remain within the limits of
the thin capitalization theory. Their financing decisions would not
ferred is premised on the fundamental difference in the nature of the in-
vestment. There is no reason, under the approach taken herein, to confine
the proposed policy to new enterprises, any more than there is reason to
confine tax-free debt recovery to new enterprises.S9 H.R. 3394, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Adverse report by Treasury
Department, June 8, 1964.
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have to be colored by tax problems inherent in the ultimate recovery
of capital.
2. Cases not within the amendment.-This amendment would
not necessarily solve the problem of shareholders of large, publicly-
held companies redeeming preferred stock. The shareholders of
such companies usually acquire their stock in the public market,
unaware of the niceties of its issuance and the state of the issuing
corporation's capitalization. If such a redemption fell without the
proposed amendment, it would continue to be governed by the gen-
eral dividend equivalence test of section 302(b) (1).
The dividend equivalence test can operate efficiently in this
limited area, for preferred stocks of large, publicly-held companies
are seldom held in proportion to the common stock of the same com-
pany. Consequently, distributions in redemption of preferred stock
seldom are pro rata with respect to common stock. Even if a share-
holder of such a company fortuitously holds the same percentage
of common and preferred, a distribution in redemption of preferred
should not be viewed as essentially equivalent to a dividend on his
common stock if it in fact reduces his proportionate equity in pre-
ferred stock.
3. The status of the pro rata standard in preferred stock redemp-
tions.-In the foregoing discussion of the judicial approach to divi-
dend equivalence, the authors postulated that the pro rata standard
of dividend equivalence was the only relevant standard. This posi-
tion must be modified in the area of preferred stock redemptions
where the pro rata factor is not necessarily indicative. If the right
of the preferred shareholder to receive dividends is fixed and limited,
it is difficult to say that a distribution outside the confines of these
limitations, even though pro rata with respect to preferred share-
holders, is equivalent to a dividend. Moreover, the redemption of
a pro rata portion of a shareholder's preferred stock has implica-
tions not present in the case of a pro rata redemption of common
-- i.e., the shareholder's right to recover invested principal and to
receive preferred dividends is pro tanto reduced. Thus, the mere
fact that a distribution in redemption of preferred is pro rata with
respect to preferred is not an indicator of dividend equivalence.
If the distribution in redemption of preferred is pro rata with
respect to the common stock, as where common and preferred are
held in identical proportions, a factual question is presented. Is .the
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preferred redemption actually a distribution in retirement of pre-
ferred? Or is it a disguised dividend on the common stock? Logi-
cally, the issue should be determined by considerations inherent in
the philosophy of H.R. 3394. If the preferred stock represents
temporary capital in a reasonable amount, the distribution should
be considered in retirement of all or a portion of that capital. On
the other hand, if the preferred is not truly temporary capital, as
where it is participating, or if it is excessive in relation to permanent
equity capital, the redemption may be in reality a pro rata distribu-
tion on common and (under the pro rata standard of dividend
equivalence) essentially equivalent to a dividend on the common.
When the preferred stock redemption issue is thus framed, cases
such as Henry A. Golwynne 00 assume their proper significance.
There a sole shareholder received a note in lieu of his salary because
of the corporation's weak cash position. On his individual return,
he reported and paid tax on the salary represented by the note. In
order to improve the corporate balance sheet, he later permitted
the note to be converted to preferred stock. Upon the subsequent
redemption of that stock the Tax Court held that the distribution
was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. This case is frequently
explained by the emotional appeal of the shareholder's having al-
ready paid tax on the amount of his salary. To tax him again on
its ultimate withdrawal would supposedly be unfair. But this ration-
ale is nonsense, for most investments in stock are made with tax-
paid funds. If the tax-paid nature of the funds will permit their
withdrawal without dividend consequences, the redemption rules are
for naught. The true inquiry in Golwynne was whether the share-
holder was converting his temporary investment represented by a
note into permanent capital when he accepted preferred stock. It
must have seemed obvious to the court that a continuing temporary
investment was'intended. The amount of such investment not being
excessive, the natural result was a holding that the distribution was
in fact in retirement of preferred stock rather than a pro rata dis-
tribution in redemption of common stock.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE 1954 CODE ON DIVIDEND 'EQUIVALENCE
IN PARTIAL LIQUIDATIONS
In the above discussion, it has been ventured that' a distribution
with respect~to common stock which is- pro rata is per se equivalent
10026 T.C. 1209 (1956).
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to a dividend. Is this also true with respect to the dividend equiva-
lence test of section 346 (a) (2), relating to partial liquidations?
Here it appears that an altogether different standard is necessary,
for distributions in partial liquidation may well be pro rata.'0 1 None-
theless, if they occur during the course of a corporate contraction,
they are not essentially equivalent to dividends.
The Senate Finance Committee report leaves little doubt that
the governing standard of section 346 is intended to be corporate
contraction, whether of the general variety conceived by the courts
under the dividend equivalence test of former law" 2 or the specific
variety now set forth in the statute.' 8 Thus, instead of examining
the pro rata character of the distribution at the shareholder level,
we must look to the contraction of corporate activities to differenti-
ate between sales of stock and dividends in the area of partial
liquidation.
The student will have some difficulty perceiving a logical link
between diminishing corporate activity and lack of dividend equiva-
lence. If the distribution is pro rata among shareholders it is equiva-
lent to a dividend, and the fact that the corporation restricts its
scope of activity hardly makes it less than equivalent.
Some area of capital gain taxation for liquidating distributions
short of complete liquidation is probably desirable,' 4 although this
may be debatable.Y0 In any event, Congress has established such
an area and has indicated that corporate contraction is to be the
standard used in defining the limits of that area. The problem is
that the test enunciated in the statute, lack of dividend equivalence,
is not helpful in ascertaining whether a contraction has occurred.
It would seem appropriate to replace the dividend equivalence test
with one more appropriate to the inquiry. Such a test might require
that "the distribution be attributable to a bona fide contraction of
a trade or business actively conducted by the distributing corpora-
10' See, e.g., Fowler Hosiery Co., 36 T.C. 201 (1961), aff'd, 301 F.2d
394 (7th Cir. 1962).
"
2 The report cites Joseph Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948), involving distri-
bution of fire insurance proceeds. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
262 (1954).
103 "Primarily, this definition [section 346(a)] involves the concept of
'corporate contraction' as developed under existing law." Ibid.
, See Surrey, supra note 88, at 5-8.See Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Inconw Tax,
5 TAx L. Ruv. 437, 472 (1950); Chommie, Section 346(a)(2): The Con-
traction Theory, 11 TAx L. REv. 407 (1956).
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tion" and that "such contraction was not undertaken principally
as a device for the distribution of the earnings and profits of the
distributing corporation." Thus, two standards would be employed
in this test, a general contraction standard and a general "anti-
device" standard similar to that of section 355 (a) (1) (B). At least
there is a logical relevance between these standards and corporate
contraction, a link which is missing between lack of dividend equiva-
lence and corporate contraction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Distributions which are pro rata among shareholders are logical-
ly the equivalent of dividends; those which are essentially pro rata
are essentially the equivalent of dividends. The uniform applica-
tion of this standard would produce clarity and consistency while
yet retaining the flexibility naturally inherent in a general standard.
The principal inquiry would be whether or not the distribution was
in fact pro rata, or essentially pro rata, and this inquiry should
be aided by a selective application of the constructive ownership
rules.
A new legislative standard should be established for preferred
stock, with the recognition that certain forms of preferred stock
are closely akin to debt and may be entitled upon redemption to
similar treatment.
A reappraisal of the dividend equivalence test in the area of
partial liquidations should be made to determine whether an ex-
press corporate contraction test might better be substituted.
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